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For over a century multiple theoretical accounts proposed different sets of necessary and sufficient
conditions for distinguishing humorous from non-humorous stimuli. The theories ranged from
Freud’s (1960/1905) expression of forbidden thoughts, superiority theories (e.g., Gruner, 2000),
and benign violations (McGraw and Warren, 2010) to incongruity resolution (Suls, 1972), error
detection (Hurley et al., 2011), and even purely neural accounts (Biederman and Vessel, 2006; Amir
et al., 2015). Proponents of the different theoretical accounts often show a high degree of conviction,
suggesting introspection might not be the best tool for judging the validity of humor theories.
Other than introspection, two methods have been employed to test humor theories: content
analysis and experimental approach. These methods have yielded much valuable insight, however
they are imperfect. Content analyses examine a corpus of humorous stimuli in an attempt to
determine whether the conditions for humor proposed by a theory are present in all corpus stimuli
(e.g., Hurley et al., 2011). Unfortunately, the conditions proposed by many of the humor theories
are too vague or abstract to allow a rigorous content analysis. Experimental approaches manipulate
aspects of the joke and measure perceived funniness or its correlates (e.g., laughter, neural
activity). Unfortunately, due to the complex, interdependent relationship between the elements
of a joke, attempts to manipulate one element of a joke can result in a different joke on multiple
levels.
I would like to propose a third approach which, while likely not resolving the dispute, might
yield distinct insights: “the frog test.” An oft-cited metaphor, paraphrased from E. B. White (White
and White, 1941, p. xvii)1 proclaims: “Analyzing humor is like dissecting a frog. Few people are
interested and the frog dies of it.” I would like to suggest, stretching themetaphor, that if the surgeon
is competent the frog might survive. That is to say, if a theory explains with some accuracy why a
particular joke is funny, such explanation might not reduce the perceived funniness of the joke to
the same extent an entirely invalid theoretical explanationmight. That is because an invalid account
would presumably distract its receivers’ attention away from the elements of the joke they found
humorous in the first place. Taking E. B. White’s humorous metaphor as an example, the reason for
its humorousness could be (among many other accounts):
1. The joy, Schadenfreude, or feelings of superiority over the death of the frog (e.g., superiority
theory).
2. Highlighting the inappropriateness of attempting to explain a joke (error detection).
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, the second account is closer to the true reason for the
joke’s funniness. Suppose the joke is presented to two groups of participants. Each account is then
1E. B. White originally wrote: “Humor can be dissected, as a frog can, but the thing dies in the process and the innards are
discouraging to any but the pure scientific mind.” The oft-used paraphrased version above arguably has a better joke structure,
as the word that reveals the punch-line (“dies”) is near the sentence’s end.
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offered to half of the participants as the reason why scientists
believe the joke is funny. The joke is then repeated to the
participants and they are asked to rate it for funniness. I predict
the first, incorrect account for the joke’s funniness would shift
participants’ attention away from the humorous element of the
joke, so participants who were presented with that account
would rate the joke as less funny subsequently, when it is
repeated, relative to participants who received the more valid
account.
The nature of the joke explanation effect can be further
explored and controlled by asking participants to rate the
explanation on various measures, e.g., How complex was the
explanation? How well you understood it? How generic vs. joke-
specific was it? How much do you agree with it? How much
did you enjoy this explanation? How funny was the explanation
itself? A baseline can be established with a control group who
reads the joke twice, but in between, rather than a theoretical
account of the joke they read unrelated text. The ratio of the
funniness rating subsequent a particular theoretical account and
the baseline score would compute the “frog test” score of that
theoretical account.
While I propose the test as a potentially useful tool for judging
the validity of humor theories, it might also provide a measure
of individual differences in humor tastes. It might be that for
some individuals with preference for an aggressive humor style
the first account in the example above would be associated with
higher funniness ratings, while for individuals with preference for
intellectual humor the second account would enhance funniness
(or rather reduce it to a lesser extent).
The “Frog Test” assumes reading a theoretical account of
a joke would direct attention to—or enhance the internal
representation of those elements or interpretations of the joke
the theory deems pertinent. The assumption is in line with
numerous studies demonstrating that context affects perceptual
and linguistic processing so as to favor the context related aspects
or meanings of a stimulus (e.g., context relevant meaning of an
ambiguous word, Simpson, 1981; context relevant interpretation
of an ambiguous image, Goolkasian and Woodberry, 2010).
Moreover, it was demonstrated that while processing a joke,
different meanings implied by the joke are activated at different
times, suggesting the focus on different aspects of a joke or a
particular interpretation of the joke can be subject to change
(Vaid et al., 2003). That said, some theoretical accounts might
predict a different outcome. For example Freudian theorists
might argue that giving the correct account for a joke’s funniness
(e.g., a repressed desire to kill one’s father) would forfeit the
joke’s effectiveness as a defense mechanism and might rather
reduce funniness the most (while increasing anxiety). Such
alternative explanations may be controlled for by the overall
pattern of “Frog Scores” for different theories and by including
in a regression, along with the Frog Score, additional measures
of the reaction to the theoretical explanation (e.g., various
ratings of it—as suggested above, galvanic skin response while
processing it). So, for example, reading a Freudian theory’s
analysis of a joke might result in a relatively large reduction,
on a subsequent reading of the joke, of its funniness ratings
(i.e., a low Frog Score)—so far, that outcome is predicted by
the Freudian theory and by the assumption of the Frog Test
for the case that the Freudian theory is invalid. However,
if other theoretical accounts of the joke that equally “miss
the mark” would result in a similarly low Frog Score, and if
other equally disturbing analyses of the joke result in similarly
increased measures of anxiety, the overall pattern of results
would go against the Freudian interpretation and suggest that
the analysis is indeed invalid as implied by its low Frog Test
score.
In summary, I propose a novel method for measuring
the validity of theoretical accounts for humor and individual
differences in humor preferences. The method relies on
the assumption that presenting participants with theoretical
accounts for a specific joke would shift their attention to those
joke elements or the perspective the theory deems relevant. A
unique advantage of the method is that it does not require
a manipulation of joke content (as does the experimental
approach) or determining whether vague or abstract theoretical
conditions are met (as does content analysis). I do not propose
the method is superior over the other approaches, rather it is a
qualitatively different method, and as such, it might yield novel
insights.
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